کنفرانس مهندسی برق ایران

صفحه اصلی / سی و چهارمین کنفرانس بین المللی مهندسی برق

Market Manipulation in P2P Energy Markets Through Bid Collusion: Incentives and Prevention

نویسندگان :

Mohammad Verij Kazemi¹ Ali Izanlo²

1- شرکت توزیع نیروی برق غرب مازندران 2- دانشگاه صنعتی نوشیروانی بابل، بابل، ایران

کلمات کلیدی :

Collusion،Game Theory،Market Settlement،P2P Trading،Stackelberg Game

چکیده :

In recent years, the design of settlement mechanisms for Peer-to-Peer (P2P) markets has been widely discussed. However, one issue that has received little attention is the possibility of manipulation and sabotage in the market settlement process. In this paper, using game theory, a new market-settlement model is proposed that takes into account the probability that the market may deviate from its natural process. In the proposed model, buyers act as price proposers and can submit their desired purchase prices. It is shown that, if buyers collude, higher utility and gains can be obtained compared with the case where the market is settled naturally. Buyer collusion, however, reduces sellers’ utility and gains because it leads to a lower market-clearing price. Thus, the P2P market departs from its natural course, and in the long term this may reduce prosumers’ incentives to participate in P2P trading and consequently decrease the use of renewable energy resources. To prevent this, a suitable model has been designed for sellers so that, if buyers collude, sellers can implement an appropriate retaliatory response. The interaction between buyers and sellers is also enabled through a Stackelberg game. Simulation results on a test system demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach in addressing this problem.